This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Drawing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993 -2011 , we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states' preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant differences between member states' preferences, which often translate into significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under individual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset differences in countries' ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting. JEL Codes: D72, C71, C72
Introduction
The power of EU member states in the Council is a recurring topic in debates of EU treaty reforms and has been extensively studied in the literature.
1 And while the relevance of power indices is still subject to debate in the academic literature 2 , anecdotal evidence suggest that they have played a non-negligible role in the political bargaining process preceding the treaties of Nice and Lisbon. Moreover, Kauppi and Widgren (2007) find that voting power explains almost 90 percent of the variance in budget shares for the EU member states between 1976 and 2001.
While the theory of power indices in voting games is well researched, a key open question is whether power indices should account for actors' preferences (Braham and Holler, 2005; Napel and Widgrén, 2005) . This is not only relevant from an academic perspective, but also of high policy relevance when it comes to negotiating revisions of voting rules, since 'empirical' (preference-based) power indices may differ significantly from their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
Standard measures of voting power such as the Shapley and Shubik (1954) or the Banzhaf (1965) index, defined as an actor's individual ability to influence the outcome of a vote on an unspecified issue, do not consider actors' preferences. Under a probabilistic interpretation (Straffin, 1977) , this is reflected in assumptions about random voting behavior, namely that actors' votes are independent of each other (Banzhaf) or that all actors are homogenous in the sense that all have the same probability of voting in favor of a proposal (Shapley-Shubik) .
These assumptions, however, are not necessarily consistent with actual voting behavior. Preferences may influence actors' voting power for two reasons: First, actors are likely to form coalitions and vote according to 'similar' preferences. Using a spatial voting model and building on the median voter theorem, Garrett and Tsebelis (1999b) presume that only connected coalitions will form, i.e., only actors that are aligned next to each other in the policy space will vote together. Ignoring preferences will therefore cause classical power indices to overstate the power of extremist and understate the power of centrist actors.
Second, actors with 'similar' preferences will sometimes form a priori coalitions (voting blocs) before the actual voting takes place (Malawski, 2004) . Since the power of a voting bloc is potentially larger than the sum of its members' voting power, forming voting blocs is a means for countries to increase their power (Widgrén, 1995) . Taken together, one could argue that only connected coalitions among voting blocs will form in the voting procedure.
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These features of voting behavior, the formation of voting blocs and connected coalitions, can also be observed in practical politics, e.g., in the EU Council of Ministers, where EU member states often try to form alliances with like-minded counterparts during the negotiations, such that preference-free voting seems unlikely in practice. Against this background the striking lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on the relevance 1 See e.g. Widgren (2009) for a survey of the literature. See, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a) , Albert (2003) for a critical review of power indices.
The following terminology will be used throughout the paper: Preference-free and theoretical power indices are used interchangeably. Empirical power indices (or preference-based power indices) are used to refer to power indices, where preferences are taken into account through the formation of a priori coalitions (voting blocs) or through the assumption that only connected coalitions (among single actors or voting blocs) will form.
of preferences as determinants of actors' voting power is surprising. This paper does not aim at adding to the theoretical controversy about the benefits and drawbacks of preference-based power indices. 4 Rather we analyze whether the inclusion of policy preferences actually leads to a significant shift in actors' voting power.
To this end we study empirically whether the theoretical (preference-free) power indices of EU member states in the EU Council of Ministers differ significantly from their empirical (preference-based) counterparts, which take the formation of voting blocs and connected coalitions into account. Our study builds on the to date largest dataset of EU Council votes over the period 1993-2011, providing us with a comprehensive and high quality dataset with potentially large variation in policy preferences among a large (computationally challenging but still manageable) number of 27 actors.
Conceptually, we build upon Pajala and Widgrén (2004) , who consider empirical versions of the Banzhaf index incorporating actors' preferences, which are based on expert judgments of EU member states' positions in a one dimensional policy space (DEU dataset).
5 Their results suggest that empirical power indices converge to the theoretical power indices as the number of items increases. While these findings are suggestive, the study by Pajala and Widgrén (2004) relies on a rather small dataset including information on 45 legislative proposals over the period 1995-2000, arising from the lack of more comprehensive data on preferences of EU member states over specific issues.
Notwithstanding the various benefits of the DEU dataset, there are also some caveats: Apart from the unavoidable degree of subjectivity involved in inferring preferences from expert interviews, this approach delivers only point estimates of countries' preferences (positions), without giving information about their variability. However, countries' preferences and the implied preference-based power indices vary over issues and time, since they are influenced by domestic and international political developments. To overcome this difficulty, Hagemann (2007 Hagemann ( , 2008 and Hagemann and Høy-land (2008) suggest using Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation (Clinton et al., 2004; Bafumi et al., 2005) based on the logistic item-response model (IRM), which allows to obtain the posterior distribution of actors' preferences (ideal points) from the observed voting behavior.
The present paper adds to this strand of the literature by including preferences (ideal points) of EU member states estimated from Council voting data for the calculation of empirical power, using a wider range of power indices, and explicitly accounting for the stochastic nature of preference estimates by random sampling and simulation. In particular, it makes the following contributions.
First, we compile a new dataset comprising Council voting decisions on 3,353 proposals over the period 1993-2011, which is used to estimate EU member states' preferences from logistic item-response models. Apart from increasing the data coverage another advantage of this approach is that it yields a posterior distribution of EU member Preference-based power indices have been criticized on theoretical grounds, the key argument being that power is a generic ability determined by the rules of a game and not by individual preferences over outcomes (Braham and Holler, 2005) . Another point of discussion is the distinction between decisiveness and luck, where the first refers to an actor's impact on an outcome as a combination of preferences and capabilities, and the latter reflects simply a coincident match of preferences with other (powerful) actors (Braham and Holler, 2005; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004) .
states' preferences rather than only single point estimates.
Second, the estimated ideal points (preferences) are used to calculate alternative empirical variants of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of voting blocs and connected coalitions. Thereby, we explicitly account for the uncertainty of the preference estimates by calculating empirical power indices based on 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the ideal point estimates. This yields a distribution of the empirical power indices, whose averages can be compared and tested against their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
Our findings suggest that EU member states' preferences differ significantly from each other, both for the full sample and for many policy areas. In addition, preferences vary over time, which is reflected in strong changes in the composition of voting blocs over years, i.e., no stable coalitions among EU member states exist over time. Regarding the implications for power, preferences appear to have two potentially offsetting effects: First, by ruling out subsets of unconnected coalitions and permutations, they lead to significant power changes under individual voting. However, once we allow for the formation of voting blocs, the difference between the empirical Banzhaf index and its theoretical, preference-free counterpart fades away as the bloc size increases. Interestingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik Index, whose empirical version differs from the theoretical one even under bloc voting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the empirical power indices used. Section 3 outlines the application of item-response models to estimate EU member states preferences from observed voting behavior. Section 4 describes the voting data and presents the estimates of EU member states' ideal points. Section 5 calculates the empirical power indices reflecting countries' preferences, accounting for the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates, and tests for equality with their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices
In this section, we provide formal definitions of the theoretical (preference-free) and empirical (preference-based) power indices that will be used in the quantitative analysis for the EU Council of Ministers: Building on Pajala and Widgrén (2004) , we introduce empirical versions of the Banzhaf index; based on Edelmann (1997) and Perlinger (2000) we derive an empirical version of the Shapley-Shubik index.
The Banzhaf Index

The Theoretical Banzhaf Index
The (normalized) Banzhaf index of country i (BF I i ) gives the share of country i's 'swings', i.e., winning coalitions where the removal of actor i makes them losing, in the swings of all EU member states and is defined as
where N is the set of EU member states (n is the number of member states), S is a coalition (formed of s countries), and ν is a function such that ν(S) = 1 if S is a winning coalition, and ν(S) = 0 otherwise.
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By construction, it holds that n i=1 BF I i = 1. Notice that for our sample period from 1993-2011, the number of EU member states (n) ranges from 12 to 27 (EU12: 1993 -1994 , EU15: 1995 -4/2004 , EU25: 5/2004 -2006 , EU27: as of 2007 . Depending on the rules of the game (voting weights, thresholds), which are reflected in the indicator function ν, there is one theoretical Banzhaf index for each regime. In our empirical analysis, the focus will be on the weighted qualified majority voting under the EU27 as laid down in the treaty of Nice (and prolonged by the treaty of Lisbon). Details are provided in Appendix A.1 of the paper.
Empirical Banzhaf Indices
We consider two empirical variants of the Banzhaf index: the middle and the boundary variation. Following Pajala and Widgrén (2004) , the definitions are given under the assumption of bloc voting. As an extension, we will also consider the two empirical variants of the Banzhaf index under individual voting. The required modifications of the definitions are straightforward and discussed below.
7
A simple example, modified from Pajala and Widgrén (2004) will be used to illustrate the main concepts. Assume there are four voting blocs, which are aligned in the policy space as A-B-C-D with weights A: 18, B: 8, C: 22, and D: 39. The threshold for the passage of a proposal is 61. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 list all possible coalitions and winning coalitions.
- Table 1 -
The Middle Variation
For the middle variation of the Banzhaf index (BF I m ), only connected coalitions are considered. With voting blocs aligned in the policy space as A-B-C-D, a coalition consisting only of A and C would not be a connected coalition, because the actor in the middle is missing (see Table 1 ). An example for a coalition that is connected and winning would be ABCD. In this coalition, A and D are the 'boundary' actors, while the actors in the middle are the 'centrist' actors. While 'boundary' actors are only defined to be critical if they can in fact swing the vote by leaving the coalition, Pajala and Widgrén (2004) define 'centrist' actors as being always critical.
We will use a slight modification of the definition by Pajala and Widgrén (2004) , which is based on the following consideration regarding the role of centrist actors. Assume that the proposal in the policy space is 'to the right' of all blocks A-B-C-D. Then, if centrist bloc B leaves the coalition, also bloc A will leave (since it is located farther away from the proposal than B), such that only C and D remain. However, in To enable a comparison of the various indices used, we use the normalized version of the Banzhaf index, whose absolute version is given by the numerator of equation (1). Since the normalization is merely a rescaling of the absolute indices, ensuring that they sum to one, this transformation is immaterial for our main questions of interest, i.e., the comparison of theoretical and empirical power indices. that case actor B is not critical by definition, but only if the remaining (connected) coalition of the blocs C and D is losing.
A difficulty in the implementation is that knowledge of the position of the proposal relative to the centrist blocs is required. If a proposal were located to the left of B, then if B leaves, C and D would leave as well, and only bloc A would remain. Hence, without further knowledge, both possibilities have to be considered.
To avoid the overestimation of the power of centrist actors, we define the (modified) middle variation BF I m i as an index, where a centrist blocī is only critical if its withdrawal from the coalition, along with the blocs located to the right and left ofī, turns the winning coalition into a losing coalition. Formally, we have
whereS\{ī ≥ } (S\{ī ≤ }) denotes the coalitionS excludingī and the blocs to the right (left) ofī. In our example in Table 1 , column (4), bloc B in coalition ABCD is not critical (as it is in the original definition by Pajala and Widgrén (2004) ), since the coalition of C and D is still winning. Thus, bloc B (as well as A) has no power at all, while C and D each score 1/2. 
The Boundary Variation
For the boundary variation (BF I b ), only connected coalitions are considered as in the concept of the middle variation. However, centrist actors are defined as not being able to swing a vote at all. The rationale behind this is that it is unthinkable that a centrist leaves the coalition when the actors on both sides of him stay in the coalition.
9 Thus, only boundary actors can have a swing. The formal definition of BF I b for blocī is given by
where b(ī) = 1 ifī is a boundary bloc, and b(ī) = 0 ifī is a centrist bloc. In our example in Table 1 , column (5), blocs D and C have 3 and 1 boundary swings respectively and score 3/4 and 1/4. Notice that the boundary variation does not fit well the concept of the theoretical Banzhaf index (ignoring the ordering of the actors) and is more closely related to the Shapley-Shubik index. As Pajala and Widgrén (2004) point out, the boundary variation resembles an empirical variant of the Shapley-Shubik index. Hence, we will consider the results for the boundary variation for completeness, but focus on an exact empirical analog to the Shapley-Shubik (and compare it with the theoretical Shapley-Shubik index) in Section 5.3.1.
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In the empirical analysis, we have also considered the middle variation using the original definition. The results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar and are thus omitted for the sake of brevity.
9
For a detailed discussion, see Garrett and Tsebelis (1999b) .
The Shapley-Shubik Index
Another widely used measure of power is the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) , which differs conceptually from the Banzhaf index in taking the ordering of the actors into account. In an alternative interpretation, the Banzhaf and the ShapleyShubik index are based on different probabilistic assumptions regarding actors' voting behavior.
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The theoretical Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of country i gives the share of orderings (permutations) of the set of n countries, in which country i is pivotal and is defined as
Based on Edelmann (1997) and Perlinger (2000) , we derive an empirical counterpart to the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI e i ), which restricts the set of allowable permutations while accounting for the location of the actors in the policy space. Under individual voting, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index is given by
where, aligning the countries in a one dimensional policy space according to their preferences (ideal points), p and q index the boundary players of the coalition S = [p, . . . q], i.e., the rank of the 'leftmost' ('rightmost') country, and b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor, i.e., if actor i is either in position p or in position q, and 0 otherwise. A detailed definition of allowable permutations and the derivation of the empirical SSI are provided in Appendix A.3. Pajala and Widgrén (2004) apply the aforementioned definitions of the empirical power indices toN voting blocs. As an extension we will calculate the empirical power indices not only for voting blocs but also under the assumption of individual voting of the EU member states. In Pajala and Widgrén (2004) the sole focus on voting blocs is natural, since the EU member states' preferences (positions) based on expert judgments (DEU dataset) are either different or exactly the same. This is not the case for our estimates of EU member states' ideal points based on actual voting behavior, which are defined as continuous variables.
Individual Voting versus Bloc Voting
To these empirical power indices under individual voting of EU member states, the corresponding definitions apply, replacing the set of voting blocsN by the set of member states N and replacing the coalitions among voting blocsS by coalitions among member states S. Analogously, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index under bloc voting is obtained by replacing the set member states N by the set of voting blocsN , and replacing the coalitions among member states S by coalitions among voting blocsS in equation (5).
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See Straffin (1977) for a discussion of the probabilistic assumptions about actors' voting behavior underlying the BF I and SSI; Paterson (2005) provides corresponding results regarding the assumptions with respect to the voting polls.
Irrespective of whether we consider individual or bloc voting, we are ultimately interested in the empirical (versus theoretical) power of individual EU member states (rather than the voting blocs). Under individual voting, countries' power is obviously obtained directly from the index estimates. Under bloc voting, countries' individual power indices are derived from the power of the voting bloc according to respective country's share of votes in the total votes of the bloc.
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Item-Response Models and Preference Estimation from Voting Data
The calculation of the empirical power indices defined in Section 2 requires information on the preferences of EU member states. We outline the approach to estimate EU member states' ideal points in the policy space following Hagemann (2008) , who in turn build on work by Clinton et al. (2004) and Bafumi et al. (2005) . The idea of a preference-based (spatial) voting approach is that actors are ordered according to their preferences in a low-dimensional Euclidian policy space (e.g., but not necessarily, on an ideological left-right scale). The locations of the actors' preferences are denoted as 'ideal points'. It is assumed that actors vote in favor or against a proposal, depending on whether their ideal point is closer to the proposal or the status quo (Steunenberg et al., 1999; Clinton et al., 2004; Napel and Widgrén, 2004) .
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In the present paper, ideal points of EU member states will be estimated from voting data in the EU Council of Ministers. Hence, there are i = 1, . . . , n EU member states having voted on j = 1, . . . , m items (proposals), which results in a binary n × m matrix Y = (y ij ) of member states' individual voting decisions, where y ij indicates whether country i has voted in favor of proposal j (y ij = 1) or against proposal j (y ij = 0). Each country's position is defined as ideal point (or preference) θ i , which is located in a (one-dimensional) policy space. The status quo and the proposal are located in the policy space with positions ψ j and ζ j , respectively. Countries are assumed to have a quadratic utility function, which assigns a higher utility to positions that are closer to the country's ideal point in the policy space. Hence, voting in favor of a proposal is associated with utility U i (ζ j ) = −||θ i − ζ j || 2 + η ij , whereas voting against the proposal is associated with utility U i (ψ j ) = −||θ i − ψ j || 2 + ν ij , where η ij and ν ij are independent error terms, reflecting uncertainty in judging the relative position of the proposal and status quo, with E(
Under utility maximizing behavior, the probability that country i votes in favor of proposal j is given by
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For alternative definitions of the distribution of power among bloc members see Alonso-Meijide et al. (2009) .
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The framework for ideal point estimation is based on item-response models (IRM) that calculate the probability of success of an individual in a test situation based on two factors, the subject's ability and the difficulty of the item (Rasch, 1980) .
Hence, the probability of a 'yes'-vote (π ij ) depends on country i's ideal point, and the properties of item j relative to the status quo, characterized by the 'difficulty parameter' α j = (ζ 2 j − ψ 2 j )/σ j , and the 'discrimination parameter' β j = 2(ζ j − ψ j )/σ j , indicating the distance (and direction) between the location of the proposal and the status quo (the no vote) in the policy space.
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Following Bafumi et al. (2005) , we assume a standard logistic distribution, such that
and the likelihood of the implied logit model with (unobserved) regressor θ i , conditional on the observed voting behavior Y, is given by
where θ = (θ i ) is an n × 1 vector and β = (β j ) and α = (α j ) are m × 1 vectors. In practice, voting behavior can deviate from pure utility maximization due to outside pressures or strategic considerations. Following Bafumi et al. (2005) , this 'nonsincere' voting behavior can be accounted for by introducing error rates δ 0 and δ 1 into equation (8), yielding the following generalized version of the logit model
The logit model underlying equation (9) cannot be estimated using standard maximum likelihood methods, since we observe only data on voting outcomes. As suggested in Clinton et al. (2004) , we will use a simulation-based Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) approach to obtain estimates of the (posterior) distribution of countries' ideal points, conditional on the observed voting data. The basic idea of this procedure is as follows. If α and β were known, the ideal points could be estimated. If the ideal points were known, α and β could be estimated. The MCMC algorithm repeatedly performs imputations of the unknown parameters and regressions, alternating between the 'estimation' of the ideal points, difficulty, and discrimination parameters, thereby sampling utility differentials from their predictive density (given the current values of the other parameters and the voting data).
14 As a result, we obtain the posterior distribution of the unknown parameters α, β and θ, where our primary interest relates to the posterior distribution of the countries' ideal points θ (Clinton et al., 2004 ). Before we turn to the estimation results for the EU Council of Ministers, a brief description of the data is given.
The discrimination parameter indicates how well an issue differentiates between legislators, with high values corresponding to a strong correlation between the ideal point and the probability of voting as expected. If β j is equal to zero, the probability of voting 'yes' is solely determined by the underlying distribution of the error terms. The larger β j , the more an item discriminates among countries and the stronger is the relation between the individual ideal point and the probability of voting 'yes'. In the standard case of a non-zero discrimination parameter, if the ideal point and the difficulty parameter α j are very close, the actor is indifferent on a certain proposal (Bafumi et al., 2005) . 
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Of course, merging datasets raises several issues that deserve discussion. First, while our new data for 2007-2011 incorporate only votes on legislative proposals, pre-2007 data also include non-legislative votes (such as Council decisions). Second, data for the pre-1999 period were not publicly available and provided by the Council Secretariat and are thus unlikely to fully cover all Council votes.
These shortcomings of the data have to be borne in mind. However, for the objective of the present paper to estimate EU member states' ideal points (preferences) from the voting data, we attach minor relevance to these issues. First, there is no strong reason to assume that countries' preferences vary systematically between legislative and nonlegislative decisions, such that the potential over-representation of legislative votes in the pre-2007 period should not introduce any distortions.
Second, the incomplete data for the pre-1999 period would only pose a problem if the missing observations were systematically related to countries' preferences. However, there is no evidence for such a systematic exclusion (Mattila and Lane, 2001; HayesRenshaw and Wallace, 2006) . In sum, given the benefits from the comprehensive period coverage and the large number of observations, we regard the use of a merged dataset as justified and suited with respect to the objective of the present paper.
One general characteristic of Council voting data that might affect the estimation of preferences should be mentioned. Due to the so-called 'culture of consensus' in the Council, proposals typically only reach the voting stage if most of the initial conflicts between countries have been resolved (Heisenberg, 2005) . Thus, the number of actual votes against proposals is very low. While such informal agreements and strategic voting behavior is captured to some extent by introducing error rates in equation (9), this is a limitation inherent to all studies using Council votes (Mühlböck, 2011) . Collecting data and exploring the nature of the bargaining process that takes place before proposals enter the stage of actual voting remains a challenging and potentially fruitful avenue for future research.
A final issue in coding the voting data is the treatment of abstentions. While abstentions in voting bodies are often treated either as missing observations or as a third vote choice, within the Council's consensus-seeking culture, an abstention is used to signal that a country holds an opposing view -a diplomatic version of a 'no'-vote (Mühlböck, 2011) . Thus, we count each abstention as support of the status quo and disapproval of the common position, i.e., abstentions are coded with 0, as are votes against a proposal.
17 If there are no observed votes of a country (e.g. because they were not eligible to vote, e.g., the UK on issues concerning the Schengen Area or the Euro), these observations are treated as missing data.
- Table 2 - Table 2 provides an overview of the dataset of contested votes over the period 1993-2011, both for the full sample and for subsamples differentiated by time period and policy areas, showing the number of proposals voted on, the total number of individual voting decisions by member states, and the mean share of votes in favor of an item.
Ideal Points Estimates for EU27 Member States
In the following, we report the estimates of the item-response model given by equations (8) and (9) for the full sample over the period 1993-2011, yielding (the distribution of) the EU27 member states' ideal points. The estimates by policy area are discussed in Appendix A.4.
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Results for all EU27 member states' mean preferences over the full sample period 1993-2011, along with the 95% confidence intervals are illustrated in Figure 1 .
19 Obviously, information on the (simultaneous) voting behavior of all EU27 member states is available only for the most recent period from 2007-2011. Nevertheless, the voting decisions from the pre-accession periods (i.e., before 1995, 2004, and 2007) contain valuable information on the relative positions of the (12, 15, and 25) incumbent EU members states and are thus included in the estimation.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , although there is considerable overlap of the confidence intervals of EU member states' ideal points, there are also several 'gaps' between the
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In this respect we depart from Hagemann (2008) , who consider only abstentions in qualified majority voting (but not abstentions under unanimity) as votes against a proposal. Apart from the view that abstentions can be reasonably argued to reflect (passive) support of the status quo, our approach has the further advantage to generate slightly more variation in the voting data. Since the share of abstentions is small, this choice is not crucial for our results, however.
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The (outlier-robust) maximum likelihood estimation of the contaminated hierarchical logistic item-response model that allows for non-sincere voting behavior (equation (9)) was performed using the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in R. A more detailed description of the implementation is given in Appendix A.2.
countries' positions.
20 Northern EU member states such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland are located on one side of the policy space, whereas southern member states like Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy are located on the opposite side. Moreover, Central and Eastern European member states that joined the EU as of 2004 are located fairly close to each other in the policy space, in between northern and southern EU member states.
Given the multidimensional nature of ideal points and policy proposals and the variation in EU member states' relative positions over proposals and time, the estimates for the one-dimensional policy space should be interpreted with care. The alignment of member states in Figure 1 should not be understood to follow a meaningful policy dimension, e.g. in terms of ideological left-right scale. Rather, ideal point estimates should be taken and interpreted as what they are, namely countries' average preferences over numerous proposals in various policy areas and time periods. However, they still allow us to judge the proximity of countries as reflected in their average voting behavior.
- Figure 1 Overall, our mean ideal point estimates are in line with previous studies suggesting a North-South pattern of coalitions in the Council, which has been complemented by an East-West pattern after the EU enlargement in 2004 (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Naurin and Lindahl, 2008; Mattila, 2008; Hagemann, 2008) .
To judge whether the differences between EU member states' preferences are also significant in statistical terms, we perform pair-wise Wald tests on the equality of countries' ideal points.
21 In 130 cases (43.2%) the pair-wise test of the hypothesis of equal ideal points is rejected at the 1% level, in 39 (13%) cases at the 5% and in 32 (10.6%) cases at the 10% level. The joint test that all EU member states share the same ideal point is rejected at the 1% level. Corresponding results for selected policy areas are provided and discussed in Appendix A.4 of the paper.
Estimating Empirical Power Indices
The estimates of EU member states' ideal points are used to calculate empirical power indices as defined in Section 2, invoking the concepts of voting blocs and connected coalitions. EU member states' power is calculated according to the present rules governing qualified majority voting laid down in the Nice Treaty (and the Treaty of Lisbon),
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The fact that all ideal points and confidence intervals are negative follows from equation (9), the identification strategy, and the dataset. Actor i votes in favor of proposal j if β j and θ i have the same sign as this maximizes the likelihood function. As neither the location of a proposal nor the yes-or no-positions are known, we restrict the country with the most/least yes-votes to be on the negative/positive side of the policy space (i.e., -1 and 1). Since we have data only on accepted proposals, it does not come as a surprise to observe only negative values of θ i and thus β j , as the yes-position will be closer to the proposal than the no-position.
21
Refer to the estimate of the n × 1 vector of countries' ideal points asθ = (θ i ) and its (estimated) variance-covariance matrix asΩ = (σ ij ), which are calculated as means, variances and covariances of the 10000 posterior 'observations'. The null H 0 : Rθ = 0 with restriction matrix R can then be tested using a Wald test given by m (RΩR ) −1 m ∼ χ 2 r , where m = Rθ is the discrepancy vector and r is the number of restrictions (See, e.g., Greene, 2003, p.95, 487) . For a pair-wise test of identical preferences (H 0 : θ i = θ j ) the matrix R is a 1 × n vector with elements 1 in the i-th column, −1 in the j-th column, and zeros elsewhere. For a test that all ideal points are the same, the R matrix has n − 1 rows (restrictions).
where the necessary quorum for the adoption of a proposal is defined in terms of a certain share of the weighted votes and the population of the member states (see Appendix A.1).
As outlined in Section 2, the empirical power indices given by equations (2)-(5) will be calculated 'directly' for single EU member states assuming 'individual voting'; in that case no voting blocs are assumed to be formed a priori, but the preferences are accounted for by considering connected coalitions only.
Moreover, the empirical indices given by equations (2)- (5) are calculated assuming 'bloc voting', where a priori unions (voting blocs) of EU member states with 'similar preferences' are formed before the voting takes place (and where the individual countries' power is calculated from the share of the country's votes in their voting bloc).
Before turning to the estimation results, we outline how we identify voting blocs from the estimates of the EU member states' ideal points and how we account for the uncertainty involved in the ideal point estimates.
Definition of Voting Blocs
In our analysis, we define two EU member states to be part of the same bloc if their distance in the policy space is below a threshold value, which is determined endogenously by specifying a maximum number of countries that may belong to a bloc.
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Thus the threshold distanced ν and also the composition of the various voting blocs is endogenously determined by the predefined maximum number of countries per voting bloc. Limiting the maximum number of countries in a bloc is motivated by the fact that transaction and coordination costs among member states are increasing with bloc size, such that there is a decreasing marginal benefit of having another member added to a bloc.
As a baseline scenario, we consider a relatively large maximum bloc size of up to 5 countries. However, in order to check the implications of alternative bloc sizes for the estimation results, we will consider alternative values for the maximum number of countries per bloc ranging from 2 to 5 below. 
Accounting for the Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates
To calculate the empirical power indices for the EU27 member states based on the ideal point estimates for voting data over the period 1993-2011 we start by using the mean ideal point estimates, yielding exactly one empirical power index for each country.
To take the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates (reflected in the posterior distribution of the estimates) into account, we take 10,000 repeated independent random draws from the EU member states' empirical posterior distribution of ideal points, and
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More formally, let d ij = |θ i −θ j | be the distance between the (mean) ideal point estimates for countries i and j (i, j ∈ [1, n]).c is the maximum number of countries per voting bloc. Letd ν be a threshold distance and Gd ν (t, p) be a set ofn voting blocs g y (y ∈ [1,n]) corresponding to the threshold distanced ν . Then i ∈ g y ⇔ j ∈ g x , x = y : d ij ≤d ν and |g y | ≤c ∀ y ∈ [1,n]. The bloc assignment is implemented by starting with a high value for the threshold (all countries are part of the same bloc), and decreasing the threshold until none of the voting blocs comprises more than the exogenously fixed maximum number of countries per bloc.
23
We limit the maximum block size to five countries as the empirical power indices remain relatively stable (and the results remain qualitatively unchanged) for a bloc size of four members or larger (see Section 5.3.3).
-for each draw -(build voting blocs and) calculate empirical power indices for each EU member state.
This yields an empirical distribution of empirical power indices, from which we calculate the sample average along with its standard deviation. By the fundamental theorem of statistics, we expect the sample mean of the empirical power indices to converge to the one implied by the mean ideal point estimates.
24 These estimates of empirical power indices will then be compared with and tested against their theoretical counterparts. Table 3 shows the theoretical and average empirical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices defined in equations (1)- (5) in Section 2 for the EU27 member states along with their standard errors.
Estimation Results
25 To facilitate the interpretation, the countries are ordered according to their alignment in the policy space as illustrated by the ideal point estimates in Figure 2. - Table 3 Column (1) reports the theoretical Banzhaf index, columns (2) 
Individual Voting
Comparing the middle variation with the theoretical Banzhaf index, preferences matter for EU member states' power. For most countries (18 out of 27), the empirical indices are significantly different from the theoretical ones in terms of a t-test (at least at 10%). A number of small EU member states with a centrist position gain, whereas countries with an extremist position lose. This is especially visible in those member states which joined the EU in 2004, which are mainly aligned next to each other around the middle of the policy space (see Figure 2) . The only country from the EU15 which experiences a significant increase in voting power (from 3.68% to 4.85%) under the middle variation is Austria. In contrast, extreme positions at both ends of the ideal point distribution result in a loss of voting power, as experienced by countries as Sweden, Denmark, the UK or Germany at one end and Spain, France or Italy at the other end.
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In fact, with 10,000 draws they turn out virtually identical.
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We also carried out the same analysis for the EU15 using ideal point estimates based on voting decisions over the period 1995-2004 and obtained qualitatively very similar results. Hence, the results for the EU15 are omitted for the sake of brevity. Furthermore, to account for a potential multidimensional policy space in EU decision-making, we carried out the analysis for individual policy areas (cf. Kaniovski and Mueller (2011) for the European Parliament). The results are given in Appendix A.4.
Hence, under the middle variation, which most closely reflects the concept of connected coalitions, empirical power is in fact pushed towards countries that are located in and around the middle of the policy space, whereas the boundary players lose. This is due to the fact that players located in the center of the policy space are also more likely to have a centrist position in coalitions (subsets of all countries) and thus -by construction -a higher probability of being critical by 'breaking apart' a coalition. Hence, the behavior of the middle variation mimics the theoretical reasoning by Garrett and Tsebelis (1999b) , who introduce the concept of connected coalitions in order to push power towards the median voter(s).
The boundary variation has the opposite effect. Compared with the theoretical Banzhaf index centrist players lose, whereas countries at both ends of the policy space gain. This result is plausible, since one would expect the swings in coalitions to happen more often close to voters with extreme locations in the policy space. The boundary variation highlights the power of the big member states (such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK), whereas most small countries' power is reduced to values close to zero. However, it should be emphasized that only the reduction in the power of the five (centrist) countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria) is statistically significant.
-Figure 2 -
A graphical illustration of these results is given in Figure 2 , which plots the theoretical and empirical power indices (panel (a)), as well as the difference between the empirical and theoretical power indices (panel (b)). With the countries aligned according to their ordering in the policy space, the (deviation of the) middle and boundary variation (from the theoretical index) show an (inverted) U-shaped pattern.
Turning to the results for the Shapley-Shubik index, for slightly more than half of the member states (15 out of 27), the empirical power index differs from the theoretical one in statistical terms. Voting power of EU member states that are located at the boundaries of the policy space (such as Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Denmark and Sweden) experience a large increase in voting power. However, the increase in voting power is statistically insignificant for most boundary countries (except for Sweden). In contrast, virtually all countries located in the middle of the policy space experience a large and statistically significant loss of voting power.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the patterns of the empirical Shapley-Shubik index and the boundary variation of the Banzhaf index resemble each other closely. They are basically equivalent for centrist countries, whereas the Shapley-Shubik index attributes even more voting power to the boundary players.
This result is not unexpected. In the definition of the empirical Shapley-Shubik index, only voters with boundary positions in the coalition, i.e., voters who are the 'last' to join a coalition can have a swing vote. An ideal point at the boundaries of the preference-distribution (of all countries) will thus also increase the likelihood of a particular country to be the 'last' to vote for (or against) a proposal in a coalition. 
Bloc Voting
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the middle and boundary Banzhaf indices under bloc voting, allowing a maximum bloc size of 5 countries. Notice that the (direction of the) deviations of the empirical indices are the same as under individual voting: The middle variation pushes power to the centrist players, whereas the boundary variation pushes power to countries located at the extreme left or right of the policy space. However, virtually none of the empirical indices (3 middle and 2 boundary variations) differs statistically significantly from the theoretical index.
The fact that the deviations of the empirical Banzhaf indices, in particular those of the middle variation from the theoretical Banzhaf index, are insignificant for most countries is due to two effects of the formation of voting blocs. First, the deviations of the empirical indices from the theoretical one become smaller in magnitude: For the middle (boundary) variation, the average absolute deviation over all 27 EU member states decreases from 2.6 (2.0) under individual voting to 1.8 (1.7) percentage points under bloc voting. Second, the variability of empirical voting power in terms of standard error increases: The average standard error of the middle (boundary) variation amounts to 3.7 (3.8), compared with 2.7 (3.7) percentage points under individual voting.
Turning to the results for the empirical Shapley-Shubik index, we observe an interesting difference to the Banzhaf index. In 9 of th 15 countries, mainly located in the center, empirical power is different in statistical terms under bloc voting as well. Hence, the results under bloc voting are relatively close to those under individual voting for the Shapley-Shubik index. While the variability of empirical power is substantially increased -the average standard error increases from 3.8 to 9.0 percentage points -the reduction in the average absolute deviation is comparably small with 3.4 percentage points under bloc voting and 3.7 percentage points under individual voting.
The Role of Bloc Size
In light of the differences between the results under individual voting (i.e., bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 1) and bloc voting (with a maximum bloc size of 5), we repeat the calculation of the empirical power indices for alternative maximum bloc sizes of 2, 3, and 4 countries. Table 4 summarizes the results and shows -for maximum bloc sizes ranging from 1 to 5 -the average deviations and standard errors of the empirical indices, along with the share of member states, for which the empirical power index differs significantly from the theoretical counterpart at the 5% level.
- Table 4 -
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Notice that -apart from Denmark and Sweden, who mark the boundary -the most drastic decline in voting power is observed for those countries whose ideal point estimates are located in the right of the policy space (and thus tend to be 'no-voters', see footnote 17). In contrast, voters with a right position (who tend to be 'yes-voters', see footnote 17) still gain (though not always significantly). This may be due to the fact that our dataset contains only voting on accepted proposals, thereby potentially overstating the voting power of countries that usually vote in favor of a proposal. With a dataset containing also voting on rejected proposals, we would expect to see a more symmetric inverse U-shaped distribution of empirical power across countries in Figure  2 .
For the Banzhaf index, the differences between empirical and theoretical power indices fade away with increasing bloc size. The threshold bloc size where the share of significant coefficients is roughly equal to the Type I error, ranges from 3 to 4 countries. In contrast, voting power implied by empirical Shapley-Shubik index, which differs from its theoretical counterpart for 55% of the EU member states under individual voting, turns out to be relatively insensitive against the formation of voting blocs. Even with a maximum bloc size of five countries, the share of significantly different indices still amounts to 37%, which is clearly above the Type I error.
This adds another interesting dimension where the results between the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index differ strongly from each other. While changes of single EU member states' power implied by treaty reforms are often very similar in terms of both indices, the proportionality of the voting system and its efficiency are typically much larger for the Shapley-Shubik index.
27 Our results suggest a further difference regarding the sensitivity of the theoretical measures against the consideration of preferences in general, and the implications of the formation of voting blocs in particular. The central role of pivotal boundary actors inherent in the logic of the Shapley-Shubik index appears to dominate the results even under bloc voting.
Conclusions
This paper tests whether differences in actors' preferences translate into significant differences between theoretical and empirical power indices, using voting data from the EU Council of Ministers over the period 1993-2011. We consider empirical variants of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, taking countries' preferences into account by restricting the set of allowable coalitions and permutations (depending on the alignment of the countries in the policy space) and by allowing for the formation of a priori unions (bloc voting).
EU member states' preferences in a one-dimensional policy space are calculated using logistic-item response models, which provide estimates of countries' average preferences over the sample period and their distribution. Using random draws of countries' preferences from this posterior distribution yields a posterior distribution of implied empirical power indices, both under individual voting and bloc voting, whose averages are then tested for equality with the respective theoretical, preference-free indices.
Results from the ideal point estimation show that EU member states' preferences do in fact differ significantly from each other, both for the full sample and for many policy areas. The formation of voting blocs increases the variability of empirical power. Hence, bloc voting may in fact be a means for countries to increase their power by strategically forming alliances with like-minded actors, though its potential will depend on the distribution of preferences for a particular voting item at hand.
Allowing for connected coalitions only, the differences in countries' preferences often translate into significant differences between countries' empirical power and theoretical power, suggesting that the disregard of preferences may result in an incomplete picture of voting power.
However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset to some extent differences in countries' ideal points in the policy space by reducing the average deviation between em-27 Paterson (2005) discusses the large differences between efficiency implied by the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik approach in the EU Council of Ministers after the treaty of Nice.
pirical and theoretical power and increasing the variation in countries empirical power. With growing size of the voting blocs, the difference between the empirical Banzhaf indices and the theoretical Banzhaf index fades away. Interestingly, this result does not hold for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variant, while showing a larger variation, differs from the theoretical both under individual voting and bloc voting.
Overall, our estimates suggest that preferences matter, with two apparently offsetting effects. On the one hand, they rule out certain coalitions (among countries remote from each other in the policy space), thereby leading to a change in empirical power under individual voting. The magnitude and direction of the change cannot be determined generally since it will depend not only on the size (number of votes) of a country but also on its position in the policy space, which will vary over issues and time.
On the other hand, the formation of voting blocs reduces the number of and the heterogeneity among actors, and thereby the difference between empirical and theoretical power indices. Again, the formation of voting blocs, as well as their size and composition, will vary over issues and time, making general statements potentially misleading. However, a key finding is that preferences -besides the rules of the voting game -can lead to sizeable shifts and large variations of actors' power. Mattila (2008) ; data as of 2007 collected from web scraping of Council documents using the interface by Buhl and Rasmussen (http://api.epdb.eu). 1) Number of observations of individual voting decisions is equal to the number of proposals times the number of EU member states that have participated in the voting.
2)
Mean of y it (×100 in %), corresponding to the share of 'Yes' votes in all voting decisions.
3) Categorization into policy areas follows Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006). Research, education, and culture were merged into one policy area due to the small number of observations. Two items could not be assigned to a particular policy area; hence the proposals by policy area sum up to 897 items for the full period 1993-2011. Information on the policy areas Statistical System, Cohesion, Development, and Energy is only provided for completeness; due to the low number of contested votes, they are not considered in the following. )). All indices are normalized (displayed in %). ***, **, * indicate whether the null that the empirical index is equal to the theoretical one is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by a t-test. 
General Affairs
Notes: Dots indicate location of mean ideal points, lines show 95% confidence intervals.
be positive. However, the posterior distributions turn out to be insensitive to the choice of identifying restrictions, given that our model is locally identified by two arbitrary constraints (Rivers, 2003) .
A.3 A Preference-Based Shapley-Shubik Index
A.3.1 The Edelmann/Perlinger Index
Perlinger (2000) derives a preference-based Shapley-Shubik Index, based on a framework by Edelmann (1997) , which restricts the number of allowable permutations to so called 'maximal chains' (M ), defined as permutation of the n actors in the ('spectrum') game, where the actor in position i (of the permutation) is the ideological neighbor to an actor in position 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 for all i ∈ N . 30 It is given by
where m = 2 n−1 denotes the total number of allowable permutations (maximal chains) in a spectrum game with n actors, and M i denotes a coalition consisting of i and its predecessors in the maximal chain M . Finally, ν(M i ) = 1 if M i is a winning coalition and ν(M i ) = 0 otherwise. The reasoning behind equation (A.1) is that -as an equivalent to the empirical Banzhaf index which allows only connected coalitions -a notion of allowable permutations of actors of the set N is required for an empirical Shapley-Shubik index. Hence, the Edelmann/Perlinger-Index allows only those permutations of N that consist of connected coalitions at any point. For example, assume that N = {A, B, C} and that actors are aligned as A-B-C in a one-dimensional policy space. Then, {B, C, A} would be allowed, but {A, C, B} would not, as {A, C} is not a connected coalition. These allowable permutations are exactly the maximal chains.
A.3.2 An Alternative Definition of the Empirical Shapley-Shubik Index
For computational reasons -the number of maximal chains increases very quickly with the number of actors n -we derive an alternative formula (equivalent to Edelmann/PerlingerIndex), which does not sum over maximal chains but over connected coalitions (as we do for the empirical Banzhaf indices) and which also more directly reveals the relation between the theoretical and the empirical SSI.
The derivation builds on the definition of the standard Shapley-Shubik index, which gives the share of all permutations of actors of the set N , where actor i is pivotal: 
A.4 Results by Policy Area
A.4.1 Estimates of EU Member States' Ideal Points
To account for the potential multidimensional nature of the policy space and differences between policy areas, we estimate ideal points for different subsamples. The estimates of the subsamples show considerable variation over years and policy areas. Results for some policy areas of particular interest are displayed in Figure A1 . The North-South divide obtained in previous studies does appear in some, but not all policy areas. While, e.g., the results for the policy area 'General Affairs' are pretty much in line with the findings in Figure 1 covering the whole dataset, there are no North-South or East-West coalition patterns to be found in the field of 'Health and Consumer Affairs'.
A possible explanation for these differences is that the policy area 'General Affairs' consists of topics the foreign ministers are concerned with, i.e., mostly foreign affairs, but also a range of issues not covered by other Council configurations. Due to this diversity of issues within that policy area, it is not surprising that the distribution of ideal point estimates is rather similar to the general distribution in Figure 1 . This is not the case for the policy area 'Health and Consumer Affairs'. Here, the extreme position of Germany might be due to the fact that Germany has already detailed legislation concerning health policy or consumer protection and thus more often supports the status quo (and rejects new EU legislation that potentially requires costly changes of national law) than other EU member states.
- Figure A1 Similar reasons might account for the ideal point distribution of the policy area 'Internal Market'. Here no clear distinction between northern and southern or eastern and western EU member states can be detected. Yet another pattern exists for the policy area 'Agriculture', where we find France and Ireland, two EU member states that are strongly supporting agricultural subsidies, on one side of the spectrum, and the UK and Sweden, who traditionally oppose such a policy on the other side.
- Table A2 Finally, it should be mentioned that not in all policy areas the null hypothesis of identical preferences can be rejected. Table A2 gives the joint tests on equality of the ideal point estimates for the different policy areas, showing that in 5 of 14 policy areas (Agriculture, Trade, Transparency, General Affairs, Internal Market) the hypothesis of equality is rejected at least at the 5% level. In the remaining policy areas the joint test is insignificant. Table A3 reports summary results for the empirical power indices, both for the full sample and also by policy area under bloc voting.
A.4.2 Empirical Power Indices
31 In particular, it gives -for each variant of the empirical power index -the root means squared error (RMSE) of the difference between the theoretical and empirical power indices over all 27 EU member states and the number of countries where the deviations of the empirical power index from the theoretical one turned out significant.
- Table A3 - The deviation of the RMSE is is fairly small with values around 3% and tends to be slightly larger for some policy areas (compared with the full sample), in particular for those, where the ideal point estimates indicate significant differences in the EU member
31
For computational reasons, we did not consider individual voting for all policy areas and the Shapley-Shubik index, but some explorative calculations suggest no qualitative differences compared with the full sample: Under individual voting, the empirical Banzhaf indices (in particular the middle variation) differ significantly from the theoretical ones for many EU member states, while they hardly do under bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 3 or more countries. In contrast, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index differs from the theoretical one in most cases.
states' preferences (Agriculture, General Affairs, Internal Market, Trade, Transparency; see Table A2 ).
Finally, also for the policy areas, the t-tests reject the equality of theoretical and empirical power indices only in a very small number of cases, suggesting once more that the deviation of the empirical power indices (and the role of preferences) is moderate at best under bloc voting. This is a result we expect to hold if voting blocs change frequently and unsystematically from proposal to proposal, such that the effect of allowing for connected coalitions is averaged out over a large number of proposals under bloc voting.
To provide some informal evidence on this hypothesis, we estimate EU member states' ideal points for each year over the period 1993-2011, and consider the bloc formation for each year to see whether there are stable voting blocs (of a least two countries) over time. It turns out that no such stable coalitions can be identified, pointing to large variations in the relative ideal points from year to year (proposal to proposal) and hence a large variation in the size and composition of voting blocs. This result is also in line with Pajala and Widgrén (2004) , who argue that no stable minimal coalitions exist over time.
